

CONFIDENTIALSUMMARY RECORD OF ELEVENTH MEETING OF  
QUADRIPARTITE WORKING GROUP ON GERMANY AND BERLINAPRIL 4, 1960Participants:FranceMr. Winckler  
Mr. de LussacGermanyMr. Krapf  
Mr. OsterhaldUnited KingdomViscount Hood  
Mr. Drinkall  
Mr. LoganUnited StatesMr. Kohler  
Mr. Hillenbrand  
Mr. McSweeney  
Mr. Vigderman  
Mr. Kearney  
Mr. McKiernan  
Mr. Dean

Defense - Col. Schofield

Mr. Kohler opened the meeting by stating the hope that the intensive period of Working Group activity now beginning would result in an agreed report to the Foreign Ministers. With this in mind, he tabled an outline of a possible report to the Foreign Ministers, plus U.S. drafts of Sections II, III, and IV of the outline (The German Question, II WQ/4.7; The Berlin Question, II WQ/8.11; and Tactics on Berlin at the Summit, II WQ/5.5). Mr. Hillenbrand pointed out that the paper on the German problem arose from Working Group discussion of the subject, plus some additional treatment of the peace treaty. Section III on the Berlin question represented the work of the drafting subgroup plus concluding sections supplied by the American side.

Mr. Hillenbrand noted with regard to the tactics paper that it was a significant one in that it could provide the general framework for treatment of the Berlin question at the summit. In effect, it represented the possible conclusions section of the Working Group report. Its basic assumption was that it was unlikely that the summit meeting would lead to agreement on Berlin acceptable to the West and the Soviets at the same time. If this were true, the problem facing us became primarily one of tactics designed to gain time for the Western side. The paper suggested that the Working Group consider what minimum steps would be necessary to continue discussion of the negotiation

on Berlin

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on Berlin,--in other words, to establish the necessary minimum of concessions needed to achieve an essentially procedural objective of continuing talks and to ensure that these minimum concessions were not exceeded.

It was agreed that a subgroup would review the draft paper on Soviet intentions in the light of a British paper on this subject and report to the Quadripartite Working Group on the following day. Mr. Kohler noted that the Working Group report should take the form of as brief a summary as possible plus a number of longer annexes.

Lord Hood asked whether the report of the Working Group designed for the forthcoming Foreign Ministers meeting should be submitted to NATO in its original form. He pointed out that it would be necessary for the Council to get the report from the Working Group in good time since it would represent the principal basis of discussion of the German question in NATO. The Working Group report could be supplemented by an oral report during the Istanbul NATO meeting covering decisions taken by the Foreign Ministers during their April meeting in Washington. Mr. Kohler said we felt that all or almost all of the Working Group report should be submitted to NATO in its original form. Mr. Winckler said the French side could not agree to this. Mr. Kohler asked whether the French side would have any objection to providing NATO with the sections of the report on Soviet intentions, Germany and Berlin, plus the back-up papers designed to provide rebuttals for possible lines of Soviet argumentation. We might possibly hold back the paper on tactics for revision prior to giving it to NATO. Mr. Winckler agreed that the first three sections might be given to NATO; he did not want the tactics section to be included. Lord Hood stressed that the Working Group now had a greater commitment to give its full report to NATO than it had prior to the December 1959 meetings in Paris. Mr. Kohler summarized the discussion by saying that unless there was specific reason to eliminate parts of the report, we continued to feel it should go in full to NATO.

Lord Hood pointed out that the Working Group was committed to a review of the Western Peace Plan which should presumably be carried out during this intensive period, perhaps in a morning editorial section. Mr. Hillenbrand pointed out that the draft submitted by the U.S. on the German question made certain assumptions on this point. He also noted that the Group should go over the list of background papers with a view to extracting debating points for the summit.

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